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Bullies on the Bench
Douglas R. Richmond∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Former United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent, who sat
in Galveston, Texas, had little patience for lawyers he perceived as
careless or incompetent.1 He freely chastised such lawyers in his
orders and, thanks to the legal media and the internet, some of his
more colorful decisions attracted wide attention among members
of the bar. Consider, for example, his order denying a defendant’s
motion to transfer venue in Labor Force, Inc. v. Jacintoport
Corp.,2 in which the hapless defense lawyer confused the transfer
of a matter within divisions of a judicial district with a motion to
transfer venue between districts, and, in doing so, apparently
misread a federal venue statute. As Judge Kent angrily wrote in his
order: “Manifestly, any person with even a correspondence-course
level understanding of federal practice and procedure would
recognize that Defendant’s Motion [was] patently insipid,
ludicrous and utterly and unequivocally without any merit
whatsoever.”3 Continuing, Judge Kent quoted the portion of the
statute that the defendant “hopelessly incorrectly interpreted and
cited” and emphasized the relevant language, as the emphasis was
“apparently needed by blithering counsel.”4 He then
“emphatically” denied the defendant’s “obnoxiously ancient,
boilerplate, inane” motion and disqualified the defense lawyer “for
cause . . . for submitting [such] asinine tripe.”5
Consistent with his tone in the Labor Force case, Judge Kent
allegedly used to brag about his ability to intimidate people and
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∗ Managing Director, Professional Services, Aon Risk Solutions,
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1. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670–
72 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (mocking the work of the lawyers for both parties).
2. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue and
Ordering Substitution of Counsel-of-Record, Labor Force, Inc. v. Jacintoport
Corp., et al., Civ. Action No. G-01-058 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2001) (on file with
the author).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
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reportedly boasted that “‘everyone was afraid of him.’”6 His
judicial career eventually flamed out in spectacular fashion. He
was accused of sexually assaulting two women on his staff and
was sentenced to nearly three years in prison after he pled guilty to
one count of obstruction of justice as part of a plea bargain in
exchange for the dismissal of multiple sex crime charges.7
Another federal judge in Texas, Sam Sparks, caused a stir in
August 2011 when his order concerning a party’s poorly-conceived
motion to quash a subpoena quickly went viral.8 “You are invited
to a kindergarten party,” he announced in the order, a sarcastic
mandate necessitated by the lawyers’ inability “to practice law at
the level of a first year law student.”9 He further wrote: “Invitation
to this exclusive event is not RSVP. Please remember to bring a
sack lunch! The United States Marshals have beds available . . . so
you may wish to bring a toothbrush in case the party runs late.”10
Judge Sparks’s sarcasm drew an e-mail rebuke from a Fifth Circuit
colleague, who found the order “not funny,” and described it as “so
caustic, demeaning, and gratuitous” that it “cast[] more disrespect
on the judiciary than on the now-besmirched reputation of the
counsel.”11 Judge Sparks was unrepentant, saying he had received
supportive e-mails from hundreds of federal and state judges.12
Mississippi Chancery Court Judge Talmadge Littlejohn
achieved notoriety in October 2010 when he jailed a lawyer for
criminal contempt after the lawyer failed to stand and recite the
pledge of allegiance in court.13 The lawyer, Danny Lampley, spent
6. Kent Sentenced to Almost 3 Years in Prison, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY
NEWS, May 12, 2009, available at http://galvestondailynews.com/story/137512
(quoting Judge Kent’s former case manager).
7. Id. (noting that Judge Kent had faced five charges for alleged federal
sex crimes in addition to the obstruction of justice charge); see also Brenda
Sapino Jeffreys, Former Judge Samuel B. Kent Sentenced to 33 Months in
Prison, TEXAS LAWYER (May 11, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticle
FriendlyTX.jsp?id=1202430610099 (reporting the history and resolution of the
case against Judge Kent).
8. Order, Theresa Morris v. John Coker et al., Case Nos. A-11-MC-712-SS
to -715-SS (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with the author).
9. Id. at 1–2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. John Council, 5th Circuit Judge Takes U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks
to Task in an Email, TEXAS LAWYER (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/
tx/PubArticleFriendlyTX.jsp?id=1202514158040.
12. Judge Defends Kindergarten Order, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Sept. 27,
2011, 2:33 p.m. ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/law.
13. Holbrook Mohr, Attorney Jailed for Not Reciting Pledge of Allegiance,
LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?
id=1202473224805; Holbrook Mohr & Adrian Sainz, Recite Pledge or Go to
Jail? Mississippi Lawyer Locked Up, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 8, 2010, available at
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approximately five hours in jail before Judge Littlejohn released
him so he could appear on behalf of another client.14 As Judge
Littlejohn later acknowledged, his action clearly violated
Lampley’s First Amendment rights.15 The Mississippi Commission
on Judicial Performance concluded that Judge Littlejohn violated
five canons of judicial conduct and a section of the Mississippi
Constitution.16 Based on Judge Littlejohn’s admission of error and
his promise to make the recitation of the pledge in his courtroom
voluntary in the future, the Commission recommended to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi that it publicly reprimand Judge
Littlejohn and fine him $100.17 After expressing what might be
viewed by some observers as insincere concern about the gravity
of the judge’s misconduct in light of the outcome,18 the Mississippi
Supreme Court adopted the disappointingly weak sanctions
recommended by the Commission.19
Finally, consider the remarks of Justice Frederick L. Brown of
the Massachusetts Appeals Court at oral argument in Edwards v.
Labor Relations Commission.20 In Edwards, George Edwards sued
the National Association of Government Employees (“NAGE”) for
breaching its duty of fair representation when it did not represent
him in an earlier proceeding.21 The Massachusetts Labor Relations
Commission dismissed Edwards’s complaint against NAGE, and
Edwards appealed. At oral argument, Justice Brown made a series
of comments to the Commission’s counsel critical of NAGE, its
president, Kenneth Lyons, and Lyons’s family.22 Justice Brown

http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=13&articleid=2010100
8_13_A8_TUPELO336814.
14. Mohr, supra note 13; Mohr & Sainz, supra note 13.
15. See Phil West, Tupelo Judge Reprimanded for Pledge of Allegiance
Incident, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 10, 2011, http://www.commercial
appeal.com/news/2011/jun/10/tupelo-judge-reprimanded-for-pledge-incident/?
print=1; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
16. Commission Findings of Fact and Recommendation, Inquiry
Concerning a Judge at 3, No. 2010-216 (Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance
Nov. 30, 2010) (on file with the author).
17. Id. at 3–4.
18. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d
968, 971–72 (Miss. 2011) (discussing the judge’s misconduct).
19. Id. at 973.
20. 660 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
21. In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 574 (Mass. 1998).
22. Id.
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stated that Lyons kept his entire family on NAGE’s payroll,
complained that Lyons and his family were feathering their nests
financially while NAGE members received nothing for their dues,
claimed NAGE was a union run amok, and asserted NAGE did not
truly represent anyone—its leaders collected members’ dues “‘and
[kept] on stepping and [bought] more condos and [had] more
expense accounts and [had] fancy banquets.’”23 Lyons learned of
Justice Brown’s comments and, despite the fact the court affirmed
the Commission’s judgment for NAGE, complained about Justice
Brown to the Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct.24
Ultimately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court publicly
reprimanded Justice Brown for his misconduct at oral argument,
calling his remarks “intemperate, excessive, unjustified by
anything properly before the court, and gratuitously insulting of
persons directly and indirectly implicated” in the Edwards case.25
Judges wield considerable power over lawyers and litigants
who appear before them. As one judicial ethics scholar has
explained:
In litigation, the judge is the maximum boss. Everyone else
is a supplicant, compelled to engage in stylized
demonstrations of obeisance. We stand when the judge
enters and leaves the room. Our “pleadings” are
“respectfully submitted.” Before speaking, we make sure
that it “pleases the court.” We obey the judge’s orders and
we even say “thank you” for adverse rulings.26
As the foregoing examples regrettably illustrate, however, these
required trappings of respect do not ensure respectable behavior by
the judges to whom they are offered.27
Regulating judges’ demeanors is a difficult task. Judges are
human and may occasionally display anger or annoyance. The
crowded dockets and scarce judicial resources common to many
courts seemingly assure some intemperate conduct from judges.28
Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control and gracious
bearings may sometimes lose patience with incompetent or uncivil
lawyers, or especially difficult or disruptive litigants. Lawyers and
23. Id. at 575 (quoting Justice Brown).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 576.
26. Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001).
27. Id.
28. But see JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 3.02,
at 3–8 (4th ed. 2007) (“Reviewing courts generally have been unwilling to
consider in mitigation the notion that the judge’s conduct was caused by the
pressures of heavy court caseloads.”).
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litigants sometimes incite judges.29 Moreover, judicial candor is a
highly-valued trait and judges must be allowed some flexibility in
criticizing the performance of lawyers who appear before them. In
the same vein, trial and appellate lawyers are generally considered
to have thick skins; indeed, tolerating judicial criticism is an
ordinary rigor of litigation practice. It is therefore no wonder that
judicial conduct commissions and supreme courts do not wish to
micromanage judges’ courtroom activities or scour their writings
for evidence of possible misconduct. At the same time, judges are
held to high standards of conduct,30 and their inability to comply
with established professional norms erodes public confidence in
the judiciary.31 As the In re Brown32 court explained:
For every litigation at least one-half of those involved are
likely to come away sorely dissatisfied, and every citizen
has reason to apprehend that one day he might be on the
losing side of our exercise of judgment. Therefore, this
arrangement requires an exacting compact between judges
and the citizenry. It is not enough that we know ourselves
to be fair and impartial or that we believe this of our
colleagues. Our power over our fellow citizens requires that
we appear to be so as well. . . . An impartial manner,
courtesy, and dignity are the outward sign of that fairness
and impartiality we ask our fellow citizens, often in the
most trying of circumstances, to believe we in fact possess.
...

29. A recent New York Times story described “a blistering courtroom
session” in a priest abuse case in Philadelphia in which defense lawyers
“engaged in shouting matches” with Court of Common Pleas Judge Renee
Hughes. Katharine Q. Seelye, Prosecution Requests Granted in Priests’ Abuse
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/26/us/26philly.html. Judge Hughes reportedly “erupted in fury several
times, accusing some of the defense lawyers of attacking her integrity and
telling them to ‘shut up.’” Id.
30. Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo, 923 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ohio 2010)
(“Judges are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct.”); see also In re
Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 2010) (stating that judges “‘should be held
to higher ethical standards than lawyers by virtue of their position in the
judiciary and the impact of their conduct on public confidence in an impartial
justice system’”) (quoting In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001)); In
re Alessandro, 918 N.E.2d 116, 122 (N.Y. 2009) (observing that judges are held
to standards of conduct higher than those imposed on the public at large)
(quoting In re Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 1993)).
31. Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing
the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2004).
32. In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1998).
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Finally patience and courtesy are required of a judge
toward those he deals with in his official capacity for the
additional reason that a judge in that official capacity is
granted the power to command silence and respect in his
presence. . . . When a judge berates or acts discourteously
to those before him—even if he cannot affect their interests
as litigants—he abuses his power and humiliates those who
are forbidden to speak back. . . . [T]here are times when a
judge must and should admonish and express harsh
judgment to those before him, but they must be limited to
the necessities of the occasion, being neither gratuitous nor
irrelevant to it.33
When judges move beyond occasional displays of anger,
frustration, or impatience and intentionally abuse or denigrate
those who appear before them, they may be fairly described as
bullies. This label is apt because bullying is characterized by a
power imbalance between bullies and their targets, and judges
unquestionably wield great power over lawyers, litigants, jurors,
and witnesses. When individual judges bully, they expose all
judges to public contempt.34 Although some intemperate behavior
from judges is to be expected if not welcomed, and not all judicial
discourtesy or undignified behavior merits professional discipline,
there is no place for bullies on the bench. This does not mean that
every abusive judge must be removed from the bench. But judicial
conduct commissions and superior courts must deal convincingly
with judges who are bullies. In some cases that may require the
imposition of substantial discipline, including suspensions without
pay and removal. More fundamentally, judges and lawyers who are
inclined to find guilty pleasure in the sort of gratuitous abuse Judge
Kent dished out in the Labor Force case need to adjust their
thinking.35
This Article examines the limits on intemperate behavior by
judges. Part II discusses the applicable rules of judicial ethics and
the means by which judges’ conduct is regulated. Part III addresses
the phenomenon of judicial bullying in more detail, first offering
33. Id. at 576 (footnote omitted).
34. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Cir. Council Conduct & Disability
Orders of the Judicial Conf. of the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 66 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“Arrogance and bullying by individual judges expose the judicial branch
to the citizens’ justifiable contempt.”).
35. See Lubet, supra note 26, at 12 (observing that many lawyers enjoyed
Judge Kent’s caustic wit and that judges delighted in his similarly harsh opinion
ridiculing the lawyers for both parties in Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147
F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001), discussed in detail at infra Part III.B).
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obvious examples of such misconduct and then exploring the
misuse of humor in judicial opinions, arguing that when attempts
at judicial humor turn into ridicule they also count as bullying. In
doing so, it uses one of Judge Kent’s best-known opinions to
illustrate the point.
II. REGULATING JUDICIAL COURTESY
Judges are required to treat all who appear before them with
courtesy and dignity, and to similarly exhibit patience. Judges must
also perform their duties fairly and impartially. A judge’s failure in
these respects may (a) subject the judge to discipline; or (b) cause a
higher court to reverse the judge’s decision and reassign the case
upon remand.
A. Judicial Conduct Rules Governing Abusive, Discourteous, or
Intemperate Behavior
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct furnishes standards for
the ethical conduct of judges and establishes a basis for the
regulation of judicial behavior by judicial conduct commissions
and courts.36 The Model Code is the successor to the Canons of
Judicial Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
1924.37 The ABA substantially revised the Model Code in 2007.
Before the 2007 revision, the Model Code had not been
comprehensively revised since 1990, although specific provisions
were amended in 1997, 1999 and 2003.38 The Model Code has
long included provisions intended to aid in the regulation of
judges’ discourteous and intemperate behavior.39 Prominently,
Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 version of the Model Code established
that a judge “shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity.”40 In 1999, the ABA amended Canon 3(B)(4)
36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble at 1 (2011).
37. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the
Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 497, 524 (2008).
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface at xii (2011).
39. Although such cases are rare, judges may be disciplined for abusive or
intemperate conduct directed at other judges. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning
a Judge, 566 S.E.2d 310, 314, 316 (Ga. 2002) (retaliating against a subordinate
judge); Nebraska ex rel. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications v. Jones, 581
N.W.2d 876, 883–92 (Neb. 1998) (removing a judge from office for, among
other offenses, repeated abuse of a fellow judge).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(4) (1990).
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to require judges to mandate “similar conduct of lawyers, and of
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s control.”41
Rule 2.8(B) of the 2007 Model Code contains the identical
requirement.42 More generally, earlier versions of the Model Code
provided in Canon 2(A) that a judge “shall respect and comply
with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.”43 This requirement is captured in Rule 2.2 of the 2007
Model Code, which states that a judge “shall uphold and apply the
law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.”44
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges contains similar
provisions. Canon 2A of the Federal Code tracks both 1990 Model
Code Canon 2(A) and 2007 Model Code Rule 2.2.45 Canon 3B(3)
of the Federal Code tracks Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 Model Code
and Rule 2.8(B) of the 2007 Model Code.46
Judges have been sanctioned under these rules for engaging in
a variety of discourteous behaviors.47 In Disciplinary Counsel v.
41. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(4) (1999).
42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2007) (“A judge shall
be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers…and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require
similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the
judge’s direction and control.”).
43. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1999).
44. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007).
45. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (2009).
46. Id. Canon 3A(3).
47. See, e.g., In re Flournoy, 990 P.2d 642, 645 (Ariz. 1999) (finding that
the judge’s regular and well-known temper tantrums, frequent abuses of
lawyers, and improper treatment of staff and witnesses, violated Canons 2(A)
and 3(B)(4), among others); Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906
P.2d 1260, 1269–70 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting judge’s defense that his rudeness and
disrespectful behavior merely evidenced his “assertive judicial style”); In re
Newton, 758 So. 2d 107, 108–09 (Fla. 2000) (reprimanding a former judge who
was repeatedly abusive, demeaning, rude, sarcastic and even vengeful toward
lawyers, parties and witnesses who appeared before her); In re Shea, 759 So. 2d
631, 632–33, 638–39 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a judge violated Canon 3(B)(4),
among others, through a pattern of abusive and hostile conduct toward lawyers,
parties, witnesses, court personnel and other judges, and accordingly removing
him from the bench); In re Perry, 586 So. 2d 1054, 1054–55 (Fla. 1991)
(reprimanding a judge who “engaged in verbal abuse and intimidation of
attorneys, witnesses, and parties” for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(3), the
latter being identical to Canon 3(B)(4) of the Model Code); In re Inquiry
Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646, n.8 (Ga. 2010) (removing from office
a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive, and insulting language
towards parties”); In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793–98
(Iowa 2000) (removing a judge who had “frequent conflicts with almost all of
the people with whom she came in contact” and whose broad and deep
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Parker,48 for example, an Ohio municipal court judge, George
Parker, was conducting a probation violation hearing when the
defendant’s mother, who was in the gallery, raised her hand.49
Judge Parker emphatically instructed the woman to leave the
courtroom.50 When she gently protested, he again told her to leave
and threatened to jail her if she did not.51 When she muttered in
disbelief on her way out of the courtroom, Judge Parker
immediately called her back, found her in contempt of court,
sentenced her to one day in jail, and then allowed officers to take
her away in handcuffs.52 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that
Judge Parker “stained the integrity” of the judicial system through
his “intemperate, unreasonable, and vindictive” decision to eject
the woman from his courtroom and jail her for contempt, and
determined that in doing so he violated Canons 2 and 3(B)(4),
among others.53

hostilities “must have touched every aspect of her judicial services,” for
violating, inter alia, Canon 3(A)(3), which is identical to Model Code Canon
3(B)(4)); In re Pilshaw, 186 P.3d 708, 709–12 (Kan. 2008) (censuring judge for
angry outbursts at jurors); In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 65–68 (Md. 2008)
(suspending judge for 30 days without pay for repeated instances of
discourteous and intemperate behavior); In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 576–78
(Mass. 1998) (finding that judge violated Massachusetts Canons 2(A) and
3(A)(3), the latter being identical to Canon 3(B)(4) of the Model Code, for
harshly critical comments directed at a non-party involved in the litigation); In
re Moore, 626 N.W.2d 374, 392–93 (Mich. 2001) (suspending a judge for
among other violations, “impatient, discourteous, critical, and sometimes severe
attitudes toward jurors, witnesses, counsel, and others present in the
courtroom”); In re Ramirez, 135 P.3d 230, 231, 234 (N.M. 2006) (disciplining a
judge who “raised his voice” with a defense attorney appearing before him,
“prevented the attorney from making her full objections for the record, and
admonished her in front of her client”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 931
N.E.2d 558, 564 (Ohio 2010) (finding that a judge who became angry with
lawyer in a chambers conference and told the lawyer that he was “behaving like
a horse’s ass” violated Canons 2 and 3(B)(4)); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356,
360–61 (S.C. 2003) (removing a judge for repeated incidents of intemperance
for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4), among many others); In re Fuller, 798
N.W.2d 408, 413–15, 421–22 (S.D. 2011) (disciplining a trial court judge who
was demeaning, disrespectful and rude to lawyers and others in his court,
including one incident in which gave a lawyer “the bird” in open court, causing
the lawyer’s client great concern about the judge’s fairness); In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882–83 (Wash. 2010) (suspending a
judge for the repeated verbal abuse of pro se litigants).
48. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio 2007).
49. Id. at 560.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 560–61.
52. Id. at 561.
53. Id.
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Judge Parker, like so many other judges disciplined under
Canons 2 and 3(B)(4), was a serial bully.54 In another case, he
attempted to intimidate a prosecutor into accepting a guilty plea to
a misdemeanor charge, a lower charge than the prosecutor was
willing to accept.55 In a domestic violence case, he both humiliated
the victim and demonstrated bias against her husband in open
court.56 In many other cases over a two-year period, Judge Parker
“routinely mistreated those who appeared before him.”57 Among
other bizarre incidents, he asked a teenage defendant, who was
Jewish, why he attended a Catholic high school; forced defendants
who were accused of alcohol-related offenses to admit in open
court that they were alcoholics; refused to return the cane of a
defendant—who therefore had to request assistance to leave the
witness box—on the basis that the defendant had used the cane to
damage a vehicle, was a repeat offender, and was “snake-bit
mean;” belittled a prosecutor in a drunk-driving case and
essentially called her stupid in open court; repeatedly insulted a
victim–witness advocate; and finally, insisted that a victim of
domestic violence tell him whether she had forgiven her husband.58
For Judge Parker’s many violations of Canons 2 and 3(B)(4),
the Ohio Supreme Court suspended him from practice and from
serving as a municipal judge for eighteen months without pay.59 In
an interesting attempt to mitigate his discipline, Judge Parker
established that his misconduct was attributable to a mental
disability—narcissistic personality disorder (“NPD”).60 Because
his expert psychologist testified that NPD was not readily treatable,
however, the Court declined to afford it significant mitigating
effect.61
Similarly, the judge in In re Sloop62 committed several serious
acts of misconduct, one of which involved a “condescending

54. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 28, § 3.02, at 3-5 (noting that “most
judges who have been sanctioned for violating Canon 3 exhibited a pattern of
misconduct”); see also supra note 47 (listing numerous cases in which the judge
being disciplined was a serial offender).
55. Parker, 876 N.E.2d at 561–62.
56. Id. at 563–64.
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id. at 565–66.
59. Id. at 574.
60. Id. at 567–69. NPD is “a condition in which people have an inflated
sense of self-importance and an extreme preoccupation with themselves.”
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PUBMED HEALTH (Nov. 14, 2010), http://
www.ncbi.nlm. nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001930.
61. Parker, 876 N.E.2d at 569–70.
62. 946 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2007).
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tirade” directed at a defendant, Ms. Mercano.63 Judge Sloop was
“rude, abrupt, and abusive” in his dealings with Ms. Mercano, and
acted more like a prosecutor than a judge during her appearance.64
He oddly defended his conduct as purposeful and also argued that
he had not lost his temper.65 The Florida Supreme Court was
unsure which explanation was worse, but concluded that, either
way, he had violated Canon 3(B)(4) of the Florida Code of Judicial
Conduct.66 Although Judge Sloop’s conduct toward Ms. Mercano,
standing alone, might have warranted punishment short of
removal, that incident was “merely the latest episode in a judicial
career marred by displays of anger that ha[d] resulted in warnings
by the [Judicial Qualifications Commission] and fellow judges to
Judge Sloop concerning his temper.”67 Accordingly, and because
more serious misconduct followed this incident just two months
later, the Court removed him from office.68
Although Parker and In re Sloop involved judges who were
accused of multiple instances of misconduct, courts are sometimes
willing to sanction judges for single incidents of intemperate
behavior that are sufficiently serious.69 For example, in In re
Ochoa,70 an Oregon judge, Joseph Ochoa, became enraged when a
defense lawyer, Edward Dunkerly, went “behind his back” to
obtain a continuance of a trial so that Dunkerly could accompany
his family on a European trip.71 Judge Ochoa left Dunkerly a
voicemail message rescinding the continuance, ordered Dunkerly’s
client to appear unrepresented while Dunkerly was in Europe, and
at that hearing disparaged the lawyer to his client.72 Judge Ochoa
63. Id. at 1057.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1058–60.
69. Judges have also been disciplined for a single incident of intemperate
behavior where they had a prior disciplinary history. See, e.g., In re Ellender, 16
So. 3d 351, 358–60 (La. 2010) (suspending a judge for a single incident of
discourteous behavior while noting that it was the judge’s third disciplinary
sanction, which the court described as “most troubling”).
70. 51 P.3d 605 (Or. 2002).
71. Id. at 606. Dunkerly had attempted to obtain a continuance from Judge
Ochoa, even going to the courthouse to hand-deliver his motion. When
Dunkerly learned that Judge Ochoa had left the courthouse and would not return
for five days, however, he was in a tough spot because he needed a speedier
ruling on his request for a continuance in order to make his travel plans. He thus
approached the presiding judge who, in turn, directed him to another judge. That
judge granted Dunkerly’s request for a continuance in Judge Ochoa’s absence.
Id.
72. Id.
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told the client that Dunkerly wanted a continuance so that he could
go to Europe “and was probably using the thousands of dollars
paid to him by the [client’s] family to go to Europe rather than try
the [client’s] case.”73 Dunkerly rushed back from Europe as soon
as he retrieved Judge Ochoa’s message, but he was forced to
withdraw from the representation because the judge’s conduct
irreparably harmed his relationship with his client.74 When charged
with misconduct as a result of this incident, Judge Ochoa admitted
his misconduct and consented to censure.75 The Oregon Supreme
Court approved the agreement and censured him.76
In re Hannigan77 is another case in which a single instance of
intemperate behavior by a judge justified discipline. The opinion in
In re Hannigan resulted from an administrative proceeding before
the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct. The judge had
presided over plea discussions between a prosecutor and a teenage
defendant in which he called the defendant’s life a “garbage pit,”
accused her of being stupid and dishonest, mocked her receipt of
public assistance, and “sarcastically referred to the defendant’s
‘constitutional right[s] to leave school, to have the community
support you, to relax, to lay back, . . . to have babies, [and] . . . to
be stupid.”78 The Commission determined that through “this
intemperate diatribe” the judge had breached his duty “to be
patient, dignified, and courteous and conveyed the appearance of
bias.”79 Declaring it “wrong for a judge to engage in name-calling
and dehumanizing remarks, particularly to a litigant,” the
Commission observed that “[e]ven a single instance of intemperate
language” may support a finding of misconduct.80 Because the
judge had enjoyed a long and unblemished career on the bench and
the charged misconduct was an isolated incident, the Commission
concluded a public warning or admonition was an appropriate
sanction.81
Despite their broad wording, Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4), and
Rules 2.2 and 2.8(B), are rules of reason.82 Not all discourteous or
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 607.
76. Id.
77. 1997 WL 809945 (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct, Dec. 17, 1997).
78. Id. at *1–3.
79. Id. at *4.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [5] (2011) (stating that
“[t]he Rules of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct are rules of reason”); see
also Green & Roiphe, supra note 37, at 541–542 (elaborating on this view).
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undignified behavior by judges directed at lawyers, parties,
witnesses, or others will justify discipline or even charges of
misconduct.83 Courts and judicial conduct commissions weighing
judges’ alleged violations should generally consider the context in
which the challenged conduct took place.84 In Turner v. Turner,85
for example, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that although a
trial judge had expressed anger and frustration with a pro se
litigant during a divorce proceeding, the judge’s conduct did not
cross the “threshold of impropriety.”86 The Court reached this
conclusion for two reasons. First, the litigant provoked the judge’s
comments.87 Second, the litigant took some of the judge’s
comments out of context and misconstrued others.88 The remarks
the litigant misconstrued were in fact awkward attempts at humor
intended to demonstrate empathy.89
In re Hocking90 nicely illustrates courts’ consideration of the
facts surrounding judges’ alleged intemperance and their
willingness to accommodate some unfortunate conduct. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Michigan evaluated two instances in
which Judge Hocking’s discourtesy was allegedly unethical.91 The
first incident involved an exchange between the judge and the
prosecutor during a sentencing hearing in a sexual assault case.92
The hearing proceeded properly for substantial time; both sides
fully argued their positions without interruption.93 As is often the
case, the prosecution argued the court should adhere to Michigan
sentencing guidelines, which would result in a long prison term for
the defendant, and the defendant urged the court to deviate from
the guidelines and impose a much lighter sentence.94 Although the
defense and the prosecution had scored the sentencing guidelines
83. In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 359 (La. 2010).
84. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [5] (2011) (stating that the
rules contained in the Model Code should be applied “with due regard for all
relevant circumstances”).
85. No. S-12405, 2009 WL 415586 (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009).
86. Id. at *8.
87. Id. at *9.
88. Id. at *9 n.32.
89. See id. at *9 n.32 (discussing one of the offending remarks).
90. 546 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. 1996).
91. The judge was accused of violating several Michigan canons of judicial
conduct, including Canon 3(A)(3), which provided in pertinent part that a judge
“should be patient, dignified and courteous . . . to lawyers,” and Canon 3(A)(8),
which provided that a judge should “avoid interruptions of counsel in their
arguments except to clarify their positions, and should not be tempted to the
unnecessary display of . . . a premature judgment.” Id. at 246 nn. 31–32.
92. Id. at 238–39, 241.
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id.
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identically, it was apparent that “Judge Hocking had decided to
lower the scoring.”95 As Judge Hocking began to pronounce the
sentence, it became clear he intended to depart significantly from
the sentencing guidelines because he believed they did not
adequately address the facts of the case.96 The prosecutor, Pamela
Maas, argued “the scoring of the guidelines was not at issue.”97 In
a flash, Judge Hocking angrily ordered Maas to sit and stated that
she could appeal if she did not like what he had to say.98 Then, just
as quickly, the judge’s demeanor returned to normal and he
explained why he believed that the sentencing guidelines did not
control his decision in this case.99
The second incident involved Judge Hocking’s treatment of a
lawyer, Elaine Sharp, in post-judgment custody proceedings. Sharp
represented the father in the case and, after the judge terminated
the father’s joint custody, she filed a motion for reconsideration.
After losing that motion, she moved to reinstitute joint custody.100
While the parties were arguing the second motion, Judge Hocking
immediately told Sharp that he considered her latest motion to be
“simply a disguised second motion for rehearing,” and he
demanded to know in what way the motion was different.101 Sharp
responded, “[a]ll right, fine,” and then brusquely asked the judge
what evidence supported his custody determination and inquired
whether he considered the father’s relationship with the child in
reaching his decision.102 Saying “that’s enough,” Judge Hocking
denied the motion to reinstitute joint custody as a frivolous motion
for reconsideration, and ordered Sharp to pay the mother’s
attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction.103 Sharp and Judge Hocking
then embarked on a series of disagreeable and disrespectful
exchanges, in which both accused the other of being on or from
another planet (the judge made the first such remark), and which
concluded with Judge Hocking sentencing Sharp to five days in jail
and imposing a $250 fine for contempt of court.104
A majority of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission
concluded that Judge Hocking was guilty of misconduct for being
rude and discourteous to Maas and Sharp, and that those events
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
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and other misconduct not presently relevant warranted a thirty-day
unpaid suspension from office.105 Judge Hocking challenged the
commission’s recommendation in the Michigan Supreme Court.106
Returning to the Maas exchange, Judge Hocking and the Court
agreed that the judge lost his temper and should have handled
Maas’s interruption of his pronouncement more graciously.107 But,
the court noted, not every “angry retort or act of discourtesy” from
a judge qualifies as misconduct.108 Rather, the facts of each
incident must be evaluated separately, and judges are subject to
discipline only if their conduct is “clearly prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”109 That was not the case here.110 Maas,
who had been given ample opportunity to explain her views to the
court on an appropriate sentence, breached established courtroom
decorum when she interrupted the judge.111 This lapse was perhaps
understandable given her surprise at the judge’s apparent intent to
depart downward from the confinement range specified in the
sentencing guidelines, but her interruption of the judge’s remarks
clearly breached the “unwritten rules of courtroom etiquette.”112
Judge Hocking’s reaction to the interruption, although admittedly
too strong, was understandable under the circumstances.113
Although the Michigan Supreme Court did not condone Judge
Hocking’s intemperate comments to Maas, it determined that the
comments did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct.114
Judge Hocking’s “caustic and abusive” exchange with Sharp
was another story.115 While agreeing that the judge had not abused
his contempt authority, the court characterized his behavior as
“shockingly injudicious.”116 The court found that Judge Hocking
instigated the confrontation with Sharp by challenging her to
explain why her motion was not frivolous, made “caustic
comments in an abusive tone, and personally attacked” her.117
Unlike his exchange with Maas, in which he was abrupt and
105. Id. at 236–37.
106. Id. at 237.
107. Id. at 241.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 242 (quoting MICH. CT. R. 9.205 (West, Westlaw through 2011)).
110. Id. (“Having reviewed the videotape of the . . . sentencing, we find that
the exchange with Ms. Maas was not clearly prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 245.
115. Id. at 243.
116. Id. at 244.
117. Id.
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momentarily biting, the judge’s persistent exchange with Sharp
reflected “a total lack of self-control and an antagonistic mindset
predisposed to unfavorable disposition.”118 Although Sharp
behaved improperly, the judge unquestionably had the ability to
regulate her conduct through traditional means, up to and including
citation for contempt.119 Instead, Judge Hocking behaved so rudely
that his misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.120
The Maas and Sharp incidents were but two of six instances of
the judge’s alleged misconduct that the court reviewed.121
Principally for his conduct toward Sharp, the supreme court
suspended the judge from office for three days without pay.122 A
dissenting justice would have exonerated Judge Hocking
altogether, inasmuch as he lost his temper but once and only then
with a lawyer who was herself contemptuous and discourteous.123
“An isolated incident of rudeness,” the dissent contended, should
be privately reprimanded and, “hopefully, prevented from
recurring.”124 Although the dissenting justice did not condone
Judge Hocking’s behavior, and would certainly censure drastic or
repeated instances of discourteous behavior, he reasoned that the
court did the judiciary a disservice when it “condemn[ed] human
failings as judicial misconduct.”125 What the generally thoughtful
dissent apparently failed to recognize, of course, is that any act of
misconduct can be characterized as a “human failing.”
B. Reassignment of Cases Based on Abusive, Discourteous, or
Intemperate Conduct
Courts may also police judges’ intemperate conduct outside the
disciplinary process. For example, an appellate court in remanding
a case may order that the case be transferred to a different judge.126
118. Id. at 245.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 245–46.
121. Id. at 236–37.
122. Id. at 246.
123. Id. at 247 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Federal appellate courts have the authority to reassign cases to different
district judges as part of their general supervisory powers. Cobell v.
Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Statutory authority for
reassignment rests in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2005), which states: “The Supreme
Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . remand the cause and
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such
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In other instances, an appellate court may actually reverse a trial
court judgment as a result of judicial misconduct.127 Two recent
cases, In re United States,128 and People v. Leggett,129 are
illustrative.
In re United States arose out of an evidentiary dispute. The
district court had repeatedly refused to admit certain evidence the
government offered, thus leading the government to petition for a

further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” See
Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics In the Federal System: A
Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 204 (2007) (stating that
section 2106 provides statutory authority for appellate courts’ reassignment of
cases to different district judges upon remand). Judicial reassignment may be
appropriate where personal bias or unusual circumstances are established.
TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1344 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Smith
v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). In determining whether unusual
circumstances exist, a court considers (1) “whether the original judge would
reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty” disregarding
previously-expressed findings or views “determined to be erroneous or based on
evidence that must be rejected”; (2) “whether reassignment is advisable to
preserve the appearance of justice”; and (3) whether any duplication or waste
attributable to reassignment would outweigh “any gain in preserving the
appearance of fairness.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 563 (9th
Cir. 1987)). Reassignment may further be required if “reasonable observers
could believe that a judicial decision flowed from the judge’s animus toward a
party rather than from the judge’s application of law to fact.” Cobell, 455 F.3d at
332. Appellate courts tend to exercise their reassignment authority sparingly. Id.
(reserving such authority for “extraordinary cases”).
127. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 803 So. 2d 787, 788–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (reversing conviction and remanding case for a new trial where the trial
judge’s rebuke of the defense lawyer prejudiced the jury against defense counsel
and deprived the defendant of a fair trial); State v. Hayden, 130 P.3d 24, 35
(Kan. 2006) (reversing defendant’s convictions because trial judge’s pervasively
intrusive, rude, and sarcastic behavior directed at lawyers deprived the defendant
of a fair trial); Schmidt v. Bermudez, 5 So. 3d 1064, 1074 (Miss. 2009)
(reversing and remanding case for a new trial before a new judge based on the
then-presiding judge’s “combative, antagonistic, discourteous and adversarial”
treatment of the plaintiff, which deprived her of a fair trial and was “wholly
inconsistent with substantial justice”). Of course, not every comment by a judge
indicating displeasure with a lawyer constitutes grounds for reversal. State v.
Hak, 963 A.2d 921, 929–30 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. D’Alo, 477 A.2d 89,
92 (R.I. 1984)). For a judge’s intemperate treatment of a lawyer to require
reversal, the judge’s comments must so prejudice the jury against the lawyer’s
client that the client is deprived of a fair trial. People v. James, 40 P.3d 36, 42–
43 (Colo. App. 2001); Schmidt, 5 So. 3d at 1074; Commonwealth v. Jones, 912
A.2d 268, 287 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. England, 375 A.2d 1292,
1300 (Pa. 1977)).
128. 614 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2010).
129. 908 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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writ of mandamus.130 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that
the transcript of the district judge’s remarks revealed “a degree of
anger and hostility toward the government that [was] far in excess of
any provocation” discernible from the record.131 The judge
suspected the government of tampering with evidence, although he
acknowledged that his supposition of misconduct was “speculative,”
which the Seventh Circuit branded “an understatement,”132 and later
described as “implausible speculation.”133 Outside the presence of
the jury, the judge repeatedly accused the prosecutors of lying, and
he further threatened to convene hearings concerning the
prosecutors’ perceived misconduct.134 Moreover, the judge
apparently failed to consider the prosecutors’ explanations for why
his suppositions were mistaken.135
The Seventh Circuit concluded the challenged evidence should
be admitted and, more importantly for present purposes,
determined that on remand the case should be reassigned to a
different district judge.136 The court reasoned reassignment was
required because “[n]o reasonable person would fail to perceive a
significant risk that the judge’s rulings in the case might be
influenced by his unreasonable fury toward the prosecutors.”137
While the decision in In re United States was based on the
district judge’s extraordinary anger, People v. Leggett involved a
trial judge’s pervasive denigration of a defense lawyer in front of
the jury.138 As a result, the court in Leggett reversed the
defendant’s conviction for carjacking and ordered a new trial.139
Problems began during defense counsel’s cross-examination of
the sole eyewitness to the carjacking. The judge interposed his own
objection to the defense lawyer’s questions, calling the
examination of the witness “irrelevant” and “silly.”140 By calling
the cross-examination “silly,” the judge disparaged the defense
lawyer and negated the line of questioning.141 Things further
deteriorated during the parties’ closing arguments. During
closings, the judge told the defense lawyer that his argument over
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

In re United States, 614 F.3d at 664–65.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
908 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
Id. at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 174.
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the prosecutor’s speaking objections was “turning . . . into a
comedy.”142 When the defense lawyer objected during the
prosecutor’s closing, the judge not only overruled the objection but
said to the defense lawyer, “[w]ould you behave like a
professional, please and not a clown.”143 When the defense lawyer
subsequently moved for a mistrial and protested that the judge’s
treatment of him during closing arguments was outrageous, the
court denied the motion and further responded, “you’re
outrageous.”144 The judge also improperly asked the defense
lawyer in the jury’s presence whether he “wished to behave like a
gentleman” or be escorted out of the courtroom.145
The Leggett court acknowledged that trial judges are
sometimes required to admonish lawyers but explained that judges
should either do so at a sidebar or first excuse the jury.146 The court
further explained that when a judge errs and makes an injudicious
remark about a lawyer in front of the jury, he should issue a
curative instruction.147 In Leggett, the judge’s many intemperate
remarks about defense counsel in the jury’s presence, and
especially the comment that the defense lawyer was acting like a
clown, were “simply inexcusable” and mandated a new trial before
a different judge.148
C. Summary
Judges are required to be patient, dignified, and courteous
when interacting with jurors, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and
others in an official capacity.149 More generally, judges must
perform their duties fairly and impartially.150 Despite their absolute
and seemingly inflexible wording, judicial conduct rules governing
courtesy do accommodate some intemperate behavior by judges.151
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 175.
148. Id.
149. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2011).
150. See id. R. 2.2.
151. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Corrigan, 826 N.E.2d 302, 303–04
(Ohio 2004) (deciding that while “[t]he judge’s use of the word ‘jackasses’
when evidently referring to attorneys who behave foolishly or who resolve cases
too slowly was unfortunate, and his reference to the clothing and jewelry worn
by some attorneys who practice in the domestic-relations field was
unnecessary,” such remarks did not justify the judge’s disqualification); In re
Hamrick, 512 S.E.2d 870, 872–73 (W. Va. 1998) (declining to discipline a
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Courts are more likely to find a judge guilty of misconduct where
the judge has exhibited a pattern of discourteous or abusive
behavior.152 Isolated incidents of discourtesy or abuse generally
must be quite serious to justify discipline by state authorities or the
reassignment of a case by a higher court. In addition, lawyers or
litigants sometimes provoke judges’ intemperate behavior.153 The
trend, however, is to hold judges strictly accountable for
intemperate conduct in court, and it is plain that judges’
disrespectful conduct toward parties and bullying of counsel are
increasingly “meeting with zero tolerance.”154 These are positive
tendencies, as judges themselves agree.155
The next step, then, is to ask what type of response by judicial
conduct commissions and higher courts “zero tolerance” describes.
To their credit, state supreme courts have in a number of cases
significantly punished judges who bullied lawyers, parties, and
others.156 In too many other cases, though, high courts have
family law master who angrily rebuked a litigant who apparently misrepresented
facts, while cautioning that the master’s actions “were not appropriate and
definitely bordered on the need for discipline”).
152. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646 & n.8
(Ga. 2010) (involving a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive and
insulting language towards parties”); In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 426–27
(Iowa 1993) (reprimanding a judge for multiple instances of demeaning and
cruel characterizations of persons who appeared before him and offering as an
example the judge’s description of a witness as “a ‘beer-bellied, full-bearded,
unemployed, seedy, coverall-clad lout’”); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356, 361
(S.C. 2003) (removing judge from the bench for his history of intemperate
courtroom behavior and his failure to modify his behavior despite being given
the opportunity to do so); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d
873, 879 (Wash. 2010) (“One or two rude, impatient, or even condescending
comments might be understandable—after all, no jurist is perfect. But more than
a dozen such instances is not understandable; rather, it evidences an
unacceptable pattern of misbehavior.”).
153. But see McCartney v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d 268,
287 (Cal. 1974) (rejecting judge’s defense that public defender’s practice of
filing affidavits challenging his fairness and accordingly seeking his recusal
provoked his hostility toward members of that office), overruled on other
grounds by Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209 (Cal.
1975); In re Barnes, 2 So. 3d 166, 171 (Fla. 2009) (stating that alleged
misconduct by others does not excuse a judge’s departure from the Code of
Judicial Conduct).
154. Miner, supra note 31, at 1122.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 632–33, 638–39 (Fla. 2000)
(finding that a judge violated Canon 3(B)(4), among others, through a pattern of
abusive and hostile conduct toward lawyers, parties, witnesses, court personnel
and other judges, and accordingly removing him from the bench); In re Inquiry
Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646 & n.8 (Ga. 2010) (removing from
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responded timidly to proven misconduct.157 Judges who admit
misconduct and promise to reform are allowed to stipulate to light
sanctions that higher courts uphold.158 Unfortunately, courts credit
apologies and promises of personal transformation in cases where
the judge’s misconduct is so obviously wrong that remorse and
reformation are no answer.159
There is certainly room for compassion, flexibility, leniency,
and rehabilitation in judicial discipline. All judicial discipline
cases, like all lawyer discipline cases, rise and fall on their facts. It
is also true that agreed resolutions of disciplinary matters are a
necessity for disciplinary systems to function efficiently. But
judicial conduct commissions and courts must recognize that
protecting the public and the bar, and inspiring confidence in those
groups, requires firmness when confronting judicial bullying.
III. RAW JUDICIAL BULLYING TO PURPORTED HUMOR
At some point, a judge’s anger, annoyance, or impatience with
a lawyer, litigant, juror, or witness crosses from simply regrettable
or unfortunate conduct to judicial misconduct. In most cases this
transformation is obvious; much like pornography, judicial conduct

office a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive and insulting language
towards parties . . . .”); In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793,
797 (Iowa 2000) (removing a judge who had “frequent conflicts with almost all
of the people with whom she came in contact” and whose broad and deep
hostilities “must have touched every aspect of her judicial services,” for
violating, inter alia, Canon 3(A)(3), which is identical to Model Code Canon
3(B)(4)); In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 65–68 (Md. 2008) (suspending judge for
30 days without pay for repeated instances of discourteous and intemperate
behavior); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356, 360–61 (S.C. 2003) (removing a judge
for repeated incidents of intemperance for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4),
among many others).
157. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882
(Wash. 2010) (suspending for a mere five days a judge who had been previously
reprimanded, who defended her abusive behavior as a matter of judicial
philosophy, and who stated that she did not “believe that the canons [of judicial
conduct] [were] binding on her behavior in the courtroom”).
158. See, e.g., In re Perry, 586 So. 2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. 1991) (accepting
stipulation to a public reprimand where the judge “apologize[d] for his conduct
and agree[d] to refrain from similar conduct in the future”); Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d 968, 972–73 (Miss. 2011)
(accepting very light sanctions agreed upon by the parties where the judge
admitted his serious misconduct and promised not to do it again).
159. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d at 970 (involving a judge who jailed a
lawyer for criminal contempt after the lawyer refused to say the pledge of
allegiance in open court).
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commissions and higher courts know bullying when they see it.
Instead of simply expressing emotion, the judge under scrutiny has
intentionally denigrated someone or purposefully trampled on a
person’s rights. The more frequent or extreme a judge’s
intemperance, the greater the likelihood of intervention by
responsible authorities or higher courts.160 In other instances, a
judge’s conduct ostensibly presents a closer call, as when an
attempt at humor in a proceeding is better characterized as ridicule.
A. Judges Bullying Lawyers, Parties and Others
It seems likely that an appreciable percentage of cases in which
judges bully lawyers are not reported to judicial conduct
commissions or appealed on that basis because the lawyers appear
before the offending judges with sufficient frequency that they
must be concerned about possible retribution.161 As an alternative
to reporting or appealing, lawyers may respond to judicial
misconduct by using procedural mechanisms to avoid those judges
in subsequent cases.162 Most lawyers have to be pushed quite hard
before they will consider reporting judges’ uncivil behavior to
authorities.163 It takes “significant courage” for lawyers who
appear in front of abusive judges, and who may be required to do
160. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 28, § 3.02, at 3–4 (“Generally, a
reviewing body will sanction a judge not only for major incidents, but also for
an accumulation of minor, seemingly innocuous incidents that, when considered
together, demonstrate a pattern of conduct unbecoming a member of the
judiciary.”).
161. See David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in
Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 934 (2009) (“‘Suicidal’ is
the adjective that comes to mind when thinking about an attorney’s report of
judicial misconduct. While that term is certainly hyperbolic . . . the
consequences of filing complaints against judges could well threaten an
attorney’s career.”); see also, Attorneys Say They Fear Retribution From Tenn.
Judges, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle
Friendly.jsp?id=1202473228336 (reporting that Tennessee lawyers were afraid
to file complaints against some judges or to move to recuse them because judges
retaliated by dismissing cases, accusing lawyers of civil contempt, and filing
complaints against lawyers).
162. Rules of civil procedure in some states permit parties to take a change of
judge as a matter of right. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.05(a) (“A change of
judge shall be ordered in any civil action upon the timely filing of a written
application therefor by a party.”).
163. See Pimentel, supra note 161, at 920 (“The reluctance of attorneys to
complain about judicial misconduct appears throughout the history of judicial
ethics.”); Don Sarvey, Confronting Judicial Misconduct, PA. LAW. (Nov./Dec.
2009), at 97 (noting “the natural and understandable caution lawyers feel about
speaking up against judges, especially local judges, given the power they
wield”).
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so again, to report those judges’ misconduct to judicial conduct
commissions or similar authorities.164 Litigants who feel that a
judge bullied them are more likely to complain, perhaps because
they are not repeat players in the accused judge’s court and thus do
not fear retaliation as a lawyer might, or because they believe the
judge’s conduct impaired their rights and they are determined to
achieve vindication. In any event, there are a disturbing number of
reported cases in which judges have plainly bullied lawyers,
litigants, and others. Some exemplary cases follow.
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States
pitted Northern District of Texas District Judge John McBryde
against the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit.165 The Council
sanctioned Judge McBryde after hearing evidence of his abusive
treatment of other judges and lawyers spanning many years.166
United States Attorneys from two affected districts made the
complaint of abuse that triggered these proceedings.167 The
McBryde decision is predominantly focused on the judge’s
constitutional challenge to his discipline, but one of the incidents
of misconduct described in the opinion is illustrative.
Judge McBryde had a standing pretrial order which required
that all parties appear at settlement conferences.168 A lawyer had
defended a corporation and its employee in a sexual harassment
case.169 The lawyer did not have the individual defendant attend
the settlement conference because she justifiably thought his
presence would be counterproductive, he had no assets that would
enable him to contribute to any settlement, and he had authorized
the lawyer to settle on his behalf.170 Nonetheless, Judge McBryde
was displeased and sanctioned the lawyer for her client’s failure to

164. In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408, 419 (S.D. 2011).
165. 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
166. Id. at 54.
167. Pimentel, supra note 161, at 931.
168. McBryde, 264 F.3d at 67.
169. Id.
170. Id. The lawyer’s belief that the individual defendant’s presence at the
settlement conference would be unhelpful was objectively valid. The plaintiffs
were a mother and her ten-year old daughter. The individual defendant was
accused of terrorizing the child by popping out his glass eye and putting it in his
mouth in front of her. Id. Given those facts, many lawyers might think that the
individual’s presence might alarm the child or anger the mother or both, and
thus inhibit settlement. Moreover, the individual defendant was not financially
able to contribute to a settlement. Id. Any settlement would have to be paid by
the corporate defendant, which presumably sent a representative with settlement
authority to the conference as required.
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appear.171 After chastising the lawyer, he ordered her to attend a
reading comprehension course and submit an affidavit swearing to
her compliance.172 The lawyer obeyed and submitted an affidavit
attesting to the fact she had attended a course for three hours per
week for five weeks.173 This did not satisfy the judge, who
questioned her truthfulness and required her to submit a
supplemental affidavit listing each day that she attended the
course, identifying the location of the course on each day of her
attendance, specifying the duration of her attendance each day, and
providing the name of a person who could confirm her attendance
on each day listed.174 The lawyer again complied.175 The special
committee of the Council that investigated Judge McBryde’s
conduct characterized this incident “as reflecting a ‘gross abuse of
power and a complete lack of empathy.’”176 The court accepted the
committee’s assessment, describing the lawyer as “hapless counsel
bludgeoned into taking reading comprehension courses and into
filing demeaning affidavits, all completely marginal to the case on
which she was working.”177
Judge McBryde’s mandate that parties attend settlement
conferences generally promotes settlement and is common
practice. The lawyer should have recognized the need to file a
motion asking that the court forego the individual defendant’s
appearance, or to have otherwise sought to have him excused.
Failing that, Judge McBryde might reasonably have been expected
to scold the lawyer or to reschedule the settlement conference to
permit the individual defendant’s attendance and perhaps even
require the lawyer to bear any delay-related expenses. The judge’s
angry reaction, however, was wildly disproportionate to the
lawyer’s misjudgment. The sanction he imposed was designed to
humiliate the lawyer rather than to induce compliance with his
standing pretrial order, and his requirement of the second affidavit
defied all reason. Sadly, this incident was perfectly in character
with Judge McBryde’s alleged reputation.178
171. Id.
172. Id. at 68.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See generally Christine Biederman, Temper, Temper, DALLAS
OBSERVER (Oct. 2, 1997), available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/1997-1002/news/temper-temper (discussing Judge McBryde’s reputation and, to
acknowledge his supposed fairness, quoting a lawyer who described the judge as
“an equal opportunity tyrant”).
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The New York judge in In re Mulroy resorted to bullying a
prosecutor because he did not like sitting in Utica, where the
underlying case was tried, and wanted to return to his home in
Syracuse.179 Describing Utica as a “‘f---ing black hole,’” the judge
accused the prosecutor of over-charging the case as a felony and
pressed her to accept a guilty plea to a misdemeanor so that he
could get back to Syracuse for a “‘men’s night out.’”180 The judge
threatened to declare a mistrial if the prosecutor refused to plea
bargain.181 The prosecutor apparently held her ground and the
judge never made good on his threat of a mistrial. When charged
with misconduct, the judge acknowledged that he had not acted in
a courteous and dignified manner, but contended that his “banter”
was merely an expression of concern about a possible trial error.182
The referee assigned to the matter rejected the judge’s argument
and the court upheld that determination.183 The court ultimately
removed the judge from the bench.184
Many cases of judicial discourtesy involve denigration,
ridicule, or other mistreatment of parties and, in particular, pro se
litigants.185 Misdemeanor criminal defendants and litigants and
witnesses whose lifestyles displease some judges are also frequent
targets of bullying, as In re Hammermaster186 illustrates. The
municipal judge charged with misconduct in In re Hammermaster
regularly asked Hispanic defendants if they were “legal” and
frequently “ordered them to enroll in English classes,” or to either
become citizens or leave the country within specified times.187 The
judge often threatened defendants with life imprisonment or
indefinite incarceration until they paid fines or costs.188 He
ridiculed a defendant who was suffering from bipolar disorder
when the defendant attempted to explain his condition at
sentencing.189 In another case, he criticized a defendant’s
179. 731 N.E.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. 2000).
180. Id. at 122 (quoting the judge).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 122–23.
184. Id. at 123.
185. See, e.g., In re Moroney, 914 P.2d 570, 571–72 (Kan. 1996) (finding
that the judge violated Canon 3(A)(3), which tracks Model Code Canon 3(B)(4),
when he belittled a pro se litigant); In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 352–53 (La.
2010) (involving a judge’s rude and impatient treatment of pro se litigants); In
re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 879 (Wash. 2010)
(involving judges’ repeated abuse of pro se litigants).
186. 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999).
187. Id. at 927, 933–34.
188. Id. at 928.
189. Id. at 932–33.
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“meretricious relationship” with his fiancée, which supposedly
impaired the defendant’s ability to pay his fine because the woman
was “freeloading off” him.190 To encourage what he considered to
be more responsible behavior by the defendant, the judge
threatened to order the fiancée to sell her car if it was not timely
licensed and insured.191 For these and other instances of bullying,
the Washington Supreme Court suspended the judge without pay
for six months.192
In In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Michelson,193 a defendant appearing before Wisconsin municipal
court judge Robert Michelson told the judge she could not pay her
fine because she had to care for her two grandchildren as a result
of her daughter’s illness.194 Judge Michelson responded that he
could not accept that excuse because the woman had no legal
obligation to support her grandchildren.195 The judge then asked
the woman why the children’s father could not support them.196
The woman responded that the older child’s father could not be
located and the identity of the younger child’s father was
unknown.197 Upon hearing that response, Judge Michelson
“became angry and said, ‘I suppose it was too much to ask that
your daughter keep her pants on and not behave like a slut.’”198
Judge Michelson then declared the daughter should not have had
children if she could not support them.199 He ultimately established
a monthly payment plan to allow the woman to pay her fine.200
Agreeing with a judicial conduct panel that the judge’s remarks
were discourteous, intemperate, and undignified, and further
evidenced socioeconomic bias, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reprimanded him.201
B. From Humor to Ridicule
The judicial bullying described in the McBryde, In re Mulroy,
In re Hammermaster, and Michelson opinions was glaring. Other
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 943.
591 N.W.2d 843 (Wis. 1999).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845–46.
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instances of bullying may be less obvious initially, as where judges
use purported humor in their opinions to cruel effect. This is not to
say that humor in judicial opinions is uniformly undesirable.202
Humor and figurative language may demystify the law, crystallize
issues or illustrate points, help place issues in context, animate
facts, and make opinions more readable.203 Unfortunately, judges’
attempts at humor often suggest to some litigants that the court did
not take their cases seriously or decide them fairly, serve only to
offend or ridicule the participants, or are at best insensitive. It is a
rare judge who can effectively employ humor in an opinion.204 On
the other hand:
If one accepts the proposition that a judge who directs
biting humor at a litigant or an attorney commits an act of
aggression, it is easy to see why humor is offensive. It is
not a fair fight: The judge gets to have the first and last
word on the matter. The subject of the judge’s ridicule has
no recourse but to accept the joke and the accompanying
humiliation.205
High courts generally discourage and disfavor humor in
opinions. As the Iowa Supreme Court once observed,
“[f]lamboyance in decorum and attempts at clever ridicule are not
admired characteristics” in a judge.206
For a textbook example of judicial bullying in the guise of
humor, we return to the court of former U.S. District Judge Samuel
B. Kent to examine his caustic opinion in Bradshaw v. Unity Marine
Corp.207 In Bradshaw, Judge Kent persistently ridiculed two lawyers
whose performance he considered inadequate. The plaintiff, John
202. See Adalberto Jordan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 693, 699–701 (1987) (offering some benefits of employing
humor and figurative language in judicial opinions).
203. Id. at 700–01.
204. One who does effectively employ humor in opinions is Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. See Gerald Lebovits, Judicial Jesting: Judicious?,
75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (Sept. 2003) (discussing Judge Kozinski’s rare talent and
suggesting that most judges should not attempt to write like him). The late
Terence Evans of the Seventh Circuit was another.
205. Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 237, 272 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
206. In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993).
207. Bradshaw v. Unity Marine, 147 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
Many lawyers who read Judge Kent’s opinion in Bradshaw found it humorous.
One who did not was Northwestern University law professor Steven Lubet, a
judicial ethics expert, who characterized Judge Kent as a “martinet” and
properly described his opinion in Bradshaw as “bullying.” Lubet, supra note 26,
at 15, 12.
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Bradshaw, was a seaman on a tugboat who was injured when he
attempted to climb from the boat onto a Phillips Petroleum
Company dock.208 Phillips initially moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Bradshaw’s first amended complaint, which brought
Phillips into the case, was untimely because it was filed after the
Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims had
run.209 Bradshaw, on the other hand, insisted his claim against
Phillips was timely because it was governed by the three-year
federal statute of limitations for maritime personal injuries.210 This
left the court to decide whether maritime law or state law controlled
Bradshaw’s claims.211 In short, this was a straightforward personal
injury case requiring simple application of the Erie doctrine. Many
cases like it had surely come before. Indeed, as Judge Kent noted,
the answer to the question presented at summary judgment could be
“readily ascertained.”212 It is therefore reasonable to question why
Judge Kent would designate his opinion for publication unless he
wanted to publicly humiliate the lawyers for Bradshaw and for
Phillips.213 Humiliate them he did.
After briefly outlining the facts of the case and framing the
issue for decision, Judge Kent launched his assault on the lawyers.
He began:
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case
involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together
delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to
cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort
which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible
explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a
secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic
words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the
back side of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope
that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like
efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their
briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred,
the Court is now faced with the daunting task of
deciphering their submissions. With Big Chief tablet
readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care

208. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 671–72.
212. Id. at 671.
213. See Lubet, supra note 26, at 13 (“[T]he only possible purpose for
publication was to add to the embarrassment of the attorneys.”).
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laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of
exhilaration, the Court begins.214
Continuing, Judge Kent stated the standard for granting
summary judgment and briefly explained the burden-shifting that
takes place at summary judgment. He then resumed his assault on
the lawyers, asserting that Phillips’s counsel had begun a “descent
into Alice’s Wonderland” by citing but a single case in Phillips’s
summary judgment motion—a case that basically stated the Erie
doctrine—without explaining its relevance.215 Moreover, the judge
complained, Phillips’s lawyer did not even cite to the Texas statute
of limitations that Phillips claimed governed the case.216 “A more
bumbling approach [was] difficult to conceive,” Judge Kent wrote
before signaling his intent to criticize Bradshaw’s lawyer by
stating, “but wait folks, There’s More!”217
Bradshaw reportedly answered Phillips’s “deft, yet minimalist
analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an
argument,” although Judge Kent did acknowledge that Bradshaw’s
lawyer at least cited the federal statute establishing the limitation
period for maritime personal injury claims.218 Bradshaw’s lawyer’s
work was hardly stellar, however, as Judge Kent made clear:
Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis
whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a
maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff “cites” to a single case
from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff’s citation, however, points
to a nonexistent Volume “1886” of the Federal Reporter
Third edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for
what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page
decision. . . . The Court cannot even begin to comprehend
why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if
Plaintiff’s counsel chose the opinion by throwing long
range darts at the Federal reporter (remarkably enough
hitting a nonexistent volume!).219
After that comparatively gentle rebuke, Judge Kent turned to
Bradshaw’s supplemental briefing, which, while containing
relevant authority, still failed to explain why Bradshaw’s claim
against Phillips sounded in maritime law. Bradshaw seemed to
argue that he had sufficiently pled a maritime personal injury claim
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670–71.
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against Phillips because he had adequately alleged such a claim
versus his employer and the vessel on which he worked. That
reasoning was doomed to fail because admiralty law must be
invoked against each defendant individually.220 Despite this critical
flaw, Judge Kent sarcastically commended Bradshaw “for his
vastly improved choice of crayon—Brick Red is much easier on
the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the
mustard splotched about [Bradshaw’s] briefing.”221 “But at the end
of the day,” the court continued, “even if you put a calico dress on
it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.”222
Finally, Judge Kent reached the core of Philips’s motion,
introducing his analysis by writing, “[n]ow, alas, the Court must
return to grownup land.”223 Describing the pivotal issue as whether
state law or maritime law controlled Bradshaw’s claim against
Phillips—an answer that could be “readily ascertained”—Judge
Kent explained that under Fifth Circuit precedent, a dock owner’s
duty to the crew of a vessel using its dock is clearly defined by
state law.224 As a result, Bradshaw’s claim against Phillips was
subject to the two-year statute of limitation provided by Texas law
and was therefore time-barred.225 The court mockingly sustained
Phillips’s summary judgment motion.
After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier,
having received no useful guidance whatsoever from either
party, the Court has endeavored, primarily based upon its
affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of
morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the
legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good
crayon seen in both parties’ briefing (and the inexplicable
odor of wet dog emanating from such) the Court believes
that it has satisfactorily resolved this matter.226
That conclusion did not terminate Judge Kent’s torment of
Bradshaw’s counsel, however, since Bradshaw still had a claim
against his employer, Unity Marine Corporation.
Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement
and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus
. . . Unity Marine. . . . However, it is well known around
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
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these parts that Unity Marine’s lawyer . . . has been writing
crisply in ink since the second grade. Some old-timers even
spin yarns of an ability to type. . . . [O]ut of caution, the
Court suggests that Plaintiff’s lovable counsel had best
upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen
what’s left of the stubs of his crayons for what remains of
this heart-stopping, spine-tingling action.227
The court concluded this passage with a footnote containing yet
another insult of Bradshaw’s lawyer derived from the “No. 2
pencil” and crayon-sharpening comments: “[T]he Court cautions
Plaintiff’s counsel not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in
hand—he could put his eye out.”228
There is nothing funny about the Bradshaw opinion. It is
principally a collage of mixed metaphors and disconnected
juvenile taunts. Several of the judge’s attempts at humor make no
sense whatsoever.229 The opinion is discourteous, disrespectful,
and undignified, and in writing it, Judge Kent plainly violated
Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.230 It
is worth examining the opinion further, however, to understand
why its issuance is properly characterized as bullying.
To start, let’s assume that the quality of the summary judgment
briefing in the Bradshaw case was as amateurish as Judge Kent
suggested. Further assume that grossly substandard legal writing
imposes a burden on courts for the simple reason that even the
most diligent courts rely on counsel for the parties to provide the
majority of the legal argument in litigated cases.231 Judge Kent had
options short of public ridicule to improve the quality of the
lawyers’ work and, in so doing, enhance the quality of his
decision-making. For example, he could have required the parties
227. Id. (footnote omitted).
228. Id. n.4.
229. Why, for example, would summary judgment briefing so bad as to be
described as “child-like” cause the judge to offer or experience “a devil-maycare laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of exhilaration”?
Id. at 670.
230. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(3) (2009)
(“A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.”).
231. See DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
LITIGATION 462 (2011) (“No matter how diligent they may be, judges and law
clerks can never know as much about cases as the lawyers do. As a result, courts
necessarily rely on lawyers to present most facts and argument.”). This
assumption does not actually apply here because the issue presented at summary
judgment could be “readily ascertained.” Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
Even so, the assumption is worth making for illustrative purposes.
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to withdraw their motion papers and resubmit them, or he might
have ordered them to file supplemental briefing and, either way,
made clear in respectful terms his great unhappiness with the
quality of the work originally submitted. He could have held oral
argument on Phillips’s motion and forced the lawyers to clearly
articulate their positions and to substantiate them with citations to
authority. If he simply wanted to penalize the lawyers for their
abysmal efforts, he possibly could have sanctioned them using his
inherent powers,232 or perhaps he could have invoked 28 U.S.C. §
1927 to sanction them.233 A show cause order requiring the
lawyers to demonstrate why they should not be sanctioned for their
slipshod briefing probably would have been equally effective.234
For that matter, if the judge thought that the lawyers’ performance
was truly incompetent, he could have filed ethics complaints
against them.235 Milder, but nonetheless significant, punitive
options might have included castigating them in a letter, or
chastising them at oral argument or in a chambers conference.
232. Courts have inherent authority to sanction the misconduct of lawyers
practicing before them. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)
(discussing inherent powers of federal district courts); Kaina v. Gellman, 197
P.3d 776, 782–83 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto,
984 P.2d 1198, 1213 (Haw. 1999)); Cimenian v. Lumb, 951 A.2d 817, 820 (Me.
2008); Dronen v. Dronen, 764 N.W.2d 675, 693 (N.D. 2009). The scope of
courts’ inherent authority varies between jurisdictions. See, e.g., Vidrio v.
Hernandez, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that
California trial courts’ inherent powers do not include imposing monetary
sanctions). In extreme circumstances, however, it may include the discretion to
dismiss a case. Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Montano v. City of Chicago, 535 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.
2008)).
233. Lubet, supra note 26, at 13. That statute provides: “Any attorney or
other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
234. Presumably the lawyers would have defended against the imposition of
sanctions on any basis by arguing that they had not acted in bad faith in filing
their deficient motion papers. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice
Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring “willful bad
faith” to impose attorneys’ fees under § 1927); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative
Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 518 (D. Md. 2010) (stating that a district court’s
inherent authority “only may be exercised to sanction ‘bad-faith conduct’”)
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.32, 50 (1991)).
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.”).
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Shunning all those reasonable alternatives, Judge Kent settled on
public shaming, which principally served to showcase his wit.
The two lawyers who were the target of Judge Kent’s derision
were unable to effectively defend themselves, as the judge
certainly knew. There was no hearing at which the lawyers could
address the court in their defense. Had they filed a motion to
reconsider or some other pleading challenging the court’s
characterization of their performance, they would have exposed
themselves to further ridicule. Any related suggestion that the
judge had violated judicial ethics rules by denigrating them might
well have provoked some form of retribution by the judge.
Although lawyers may appeal from final orders imposing nonmonetary sanctions, critical statements in opinions generally
cannot be appealed under the final judgment rule.236 Even appellate
courts that take comparatively lenient approaches to allowing
lawyers to appeal from scoldings administered by lower courts still
require (1) that judicial criticism be expressly denominated as a
reprimand and thus appropriately characterized as a sanction; or
(2) that the trial court make specific findings of professional
misconduct.237 At the time of the Bradshaw decision the Fifth
Circuit followed the second approach, as it does to this day.238 In
any event, Judge Kent did neither of those things in his summary
judgment order. No courts permit lawyers to appeal from routine
judicial criticism or commentary on their performance.239
Bradshaw must have been stunned by the opinion. Judge
Kent’s snide comment about a “remarkably long walk on a short
legal pier” had to be particularly galling since Bradshaw was
injured when disembarking from a boat onto a dock.240 The judge’s
reference to the “odor of wet dog”241 that emanated from the
parties’ pleadings trivialized Bradshaw’s claims.242 Little in the
opinion would have suggested to Bradshaw that Judge Kent even
took his case seriously. Instead, the opinion might well have ruined
Bradshaw’s relationship with his lawyer, who Judge Kent had
236. See United States v. Williams (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir.
1998) (stating the “abecedarian rule that federal appellate courts review
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees—not opinions, factual findings,
reasoning, or explanations”).
237. Douglas R. Richmond, Appealing from Judicial Scoldings, 62 BAYLOR
L. REV. 741, 771 (2010).
238. Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832–33 (5th Cir. 1997).
239. Richmond, supra note 237, at 783.
240. Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
241. Id.
242. Lubet, supra note 26, at 14.
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clearly and publicly branded incompetent. Any such harm would
have had immediate consequences, inasmuch as Bradshaw had to
consider the prospects of success on his claims against the
remaining defendant, Unity Marine. Given Judge Kent’s opinion,
how could Bradshaw reasonably have confidence in his lawyer
going forward? Regardless, Bradshaw could not force Judge Kent
to vacate his opinion.243 Because Judge Kent’s grant of summary
judgment to Phillips appears to have been legally correct,244
Bradshaw had no valid basis for appeal. There being no apparent
ground for reversal, this was not a case in which the Fifth Circuit
could have used its supervisory powers to assign a different judge
upon remand.
Granted, the lawyers or Bradshaw could have complained
about Judge Kent’s conduct to the Judicial Council of the Fifth
Circuit, but that option was unlikely to afford them satisfaction.
From the lawyers’ standpoint, the damage was done as soon as the
opinion became available on Westlaw and LexisNexis; the Council
would never have acted so hastily as to prevent the opinion’s
electronic publication or, for that matter, its print publication in the
Federal Supplement—assuming the Council would have in fact
determined that Judge Kent committed misconduct and that the
opinion should be withdrawn. With all due respect to the many fine
judges on the Fifth Circuit, that is not a reliable assumption.
Consider that when Judge Kent was originally found to have
committed two acts of serious sexual misconduct involving his
former case manager, Cathy McBroom, which ultimately led to his
indictment, the Council reprimanded him, suspended him with pay
for four months, and relocated his chambers from Galveston to
Houston.245 That relatively light penalty for arguably impeachable
misconduct hardly inspires confidence that the Council would have
sanctioned Judge Kent for his distemper in Bradshaw.
Furthermore, the lawyers had to be concerned that making a
complaint against Judge Kent would expose them and their clients
to his wrath in any other cases that came before him. They could
not have avoided that risk by seeking his recusal in those cases.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires a district judge to
243. David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 573 (2001).
244. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 671–72.
245. Order of Reprimand and Reasons at 2, In re Complaint of Misconduct
Against United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent Under the Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980, Docket No. 07-05-351-0086 (5th Cir. Judicial
Council Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with the author); Judicial Panel to Reopen Kent
Misconduct Probe, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS (Feb. 14, 2009),
available at http://galvestondailynews.com/story/131578.
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disqualify himself “where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party,”246 such an infirmity must arise from an
extrajudicial source.247 That was not the case here.248 While 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself where “his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”249 Judge Kent’s
denigration of both lawyers in Bradshaw militated against any
claim of partiality.250
Long story short, the lawyers and plaintiff in Bradshaw were
essentially powerless to prevent their deliberate humiliation by
Judge Kent. Judge Kent held all the cards. Although there are cases
in which lawyers may be embarrassed deservedly by a court’s
comments on their conduct, as where sanctions are imposed or
contempt is found, there is a vast difference between a judge’s
necessarily harsh condemnation of a lawyer’s work or conduct and
the publication of gratuitous insults.251 There is never a place for
the latter. No matter how flawed the lawyers’ performances in
Bradshaw, their errors were mild in comparison to Judge Kent’s.252
IV. CONCLUSION
Regulating judges’ demeanors is a difficult task. Judges are
human, and they may occasionally display anger or annoyance.
Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control may sometimes
lose patience when dealing with incompetent or uncivil lawyers, or
unusually difficult or disruptive litigants. Lawyers and litigants
sometimes incite judges. Moreover, judicial candor is a highly
valued trait and judges must enjoy some flexibility in criticizing
the performance of lawyers who appear before them. We generally
consider trial and appellate lawyers to have thick skins; indeed,
tolerating judicial criticism is an ordinary rigor of trial and
appellate practice. At the same time, judges are held to high
standards of conduct, and their inability to comply with
professional norms erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
If some intemperate behavior by judges is to be expected and
even tolerated up to a point, there is no justification for judges
246. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006).
247. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996).
248. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 28, § 4.05A, at 4–17 (indicating that
“occurrences in the context of a court proceeding” are not extrajudicial sources
that would support a judge’s disqualification).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
250. Lubet, supra note 26, at 12 n.2.
251. See id. at 13 (making this point in reference to the Bradshaw opinion).
252. See id. at 16 (“[S]lipshod lawyering can be a problem. But in the end, an
incompetent lawyer is far less dangerous than a judicial bully.”).
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behaving like bullies. Judges who abuse lawyers, litigants, jurors,
witnesses, and others who appear before them do great damage to
the judiciary as a whole. Parties, jurors, and witnesses who do not
regularly appear in court and who are bullied when they do are
likely to form lasting negative impressions about the justice
system. Targets of judicial bullying may be left with the
impression that they were treated unfairly, that the court did not
take their cases seriously, or that “justice” is the province of a
privileged few. Judicial bullying may chill zealous advocacy. For
example, lawyers who reasonably apprehend abuse or ridicule by a
judge known for such behavior may be tempted to avoid making
good faith arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law out of the concern that their reward for doing so will
be denigration or public humiliation.253 Lawyers who do confront
judicial bullies risk retaliation against them and their clients in that
case and others.
Fortunately, courts and judicial conduct commissions are
increasingly demonstrating their willingness to curb the bullying of
the minority of judges who engage in it. They must continue to do
so. In some cases, significant disciplinary action such as
suspension without pay and removal from the bench may be
required. It is clearly insufficient, for example, for a vengeful
judge such as Talmadge Littlejohn, who jailed a lawyer for
refusing to recite the pledge of allegiance, to escape with a public
reprimand and a paltry $100 fine.254 Among other problems, the
failure to meaningfully discipline judges who engage in serious
misconduct discourages lawyers from reporting such incidents to
appropriate authorities. It is also worth considering whether there
is a need for more proactive measures, such as continuing
education programs, that may be effective in avoiding or reducing
abusive conduct by judges. One way or the other, there is simply
no room for bullies on the bench.

253. Id. at 15.
254. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.

